Or with a belief, we might also ask, given the craziness that is conducted in God’s name every day, right here in Oshkosh. (No, I don’t have any examples, but I’m sure there must be. It wouldn’t be good of me, any way, to tell tales of bad behavior, would it? Certainly not in writing.) Epstein is more charitable than I in his book, arguing not so much that religious people can be bad – Sam Harris has shown that well enough, I’d say – as much as that non-religious people can be good. Not many people apparently are willing to say that.
“One out of every two Americans admits to being prejudiced against fellow citizens who don’t believe in God. No other minority group in this country is rejected by such large numbers.” [Introduction] Fundamentalists keep claiming that they are a persecuted minority. (Pat Robertson, who, I am told is still alive, recently cited the very funny SNL skit that lampooned Tim Tebow’s religious behavior as the latest proof that Christians are the object of the world’s persecution. If people would stop making the faith so easy to parody, “the world” might find someone else to poke fun at.) I’m sure Epstein is right that non-believers suffer far more for their non-faith than most of us faith-folk do for faith. Which reminds me of question from my evangelical days that applies to me in my liberal days: if I were arrested for being a Christian, could anyone find enough evidence to convict me? But I digress.
Epstein, to our shame, is I’m sure right: religious people behave badly toward atheists. The question is Why? I suppose it must have a lot to do with our human longing for conformity. And the longing for certainty – a word our group has talked about a lot. If ten of us in a room all profess the same belief (set aside here the possibility that some of us say we believe, but don’t really), it feels good. And we won’t have to debate that item of belief, which is a time-saver! But if one of us breaks rank, and questions . . . there enters some discomfort. The belief is suddenly a bit less certain, all because of that one voice. And two voices . . . three . . .
The “good” behavior toward those dissenting voices, says my faith, is to respect, listen, learn from the minority, to wish them well, and to thereby love them – even to the point of death if need be. Too many times, though, Christians fearful for their own beliefs, and angry at those who question them, have denied their own faith and in the name of saving society attack rather than love the dissenter.
Which, in my mind, doesn’t prove their faith wrong; only that they have not lived out their faith.
Greg Epstein's book, Good Without God? is very well written, and raises some excellent questions that should help us sharpen just what it is we believe, and what difference it makes in how we live.
Ralph,
ReplyDeleteAs you know, I couldn’t attend the book club meeting, last Saturday, but perhaps I can contribute to the discussion here, on your blog. (Apparently I am the first to try this, seeing no other comments regarding any of your blog posts, so maybe this will set a new precedent for online discussion of our books.)
I wish to comment on 2 points at the end of the first chapter (pgs. 34-7) of Epstein’s book, where he defends both:
(1) the ‘speciesist’ ethics of “The Humanist Manifesto” and “ Humanism”, and
(2) ‘subjective values’ and ‘subjective arguments’ against ‘objective values’ and ‘objective truth’
_Good Without God_, by Greg Epstein, pg 34
http://books.google.com/books?id=lizAK72dCUMC&lpg=PP1&pg=PA34#v=onepage&q&f=false
On the 1st point, Epstein apparently wants to have it both ways by defending a speciesist view of ethics that is exclusively concerned with human welfare, and accepting the notion that ethics applies to both humans and other animals. Perhaps I am misreading Epstein, but that seems quite contradictory to me. A few years ago, Peter Singer, a Princeton University Professor of Bioethics who is widely considered to be the world’s most influential living moral philosopher, and the author of _Animal Liberation_ (aka the “Bible” of the modern worldwide Animal Liberation movement), was invited to sign the Humanist Manifesto III, but he strongly objected to its speciesist ethic, which he views as a legacy of traditional Christian ethics, and, therefore, publicly refused to sign it:
"Taking Humanism Beyond Speciesism"
http://www.utilitarian.net/singer/by/200410--.htm
On the 2nd point, Epstein’s dismissal of objectivism, as if the truth of a subjective (as opposed to objective) theory of values is beyond doubt, may be a bit more excusable, given that it was published before Derek Parfit’s very challenging new book, _On What Matters_ (2011). That book has proved to be persuasive enough to make some leading philosophers, including Peter Singer, reconsider the subject of objectivism and the existence of objective moral truths, as opposed to merely subjective values. Whereas all of Epstein’s defenders of objective values are religious leaders, Parfit’s arguments are purely secular, as noted in this review:
“Does Anything Matter?”
by Peter Singer
http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/singer75/English
At the end of section 8 (chapter 3), Parfit puts the issue into the context of contemporary philosophy:
“Subjectivism about Reasons is now very widely accepted. Many people take it for granted that we have subject-given reasons. Korsgaard for example writes that, if some act ‘is a means to getting what you want … no one doubts that this is a reason’. Williams writes: ‘Desiring to do something is of course a reason for doing it.’ In many books and articles, Subjectivism is not even claimed to be the best of several views, but is presented as if it were the only possible view. So it is of great importance whether this view is true.”
-- Derek Parfit, _On What Matters_
http://books.google.com/books?id=CaTCWUvNr_EC&pg=PT110&source=gbs_toc_r&cad=4#v=onepage&q&f=false
To be fair, I am not entirely sure of exactly how Epstein’s use of the phrases “subjective values”, “objective values” and “objective truth” relate to Parfit’s use of “subjectivism about reasons” and related references to the subjective and objective, but it certainly does appear, at least, that they may be at odds with each other on a deep theoretical level. For a better sense of the controversy, see Parfit’s summary of section 3, “Two Kinds of Theory”:
Summary
http://books.google.com/books?id=CaTCWUvNr_EC&pg=PT51&source=gbs_toc_r&cad=4#v=onepage&q&f=false
My understanding is that, Parfit’s view is that an example of an objective moral truth may be that ‘It is wrong to cause pointless suffering.’ (Disclaimer: This is not an exact quote, and I could be wrong about this—as you know, his book is hard to understand!)
In the first article Steve cites ("Taking Humanism Beyond Speciesism") Singer uses biblical stories to show that the Abrahamic religions historically have indeed assumed that the human species is superior to all other species, and that superiority has meant the exploitation of animals. Figures like Francis of Assisi, while admired by the church (reluctantly), have not served to change the overall prejudice that because we are more powerful intellectually we can "have dominion" over the animal realm. Singer's criticism of Humanism as expressed in the Humanist Manifesto is that is does not repudiate that historic and still prevailing notion -- a notion that has led to so much suffering on the part of our animals.
DeleteIt's not up to me to intervene in this disagreement; to use a very bad metaphor in this context, I don't have a dog in that fight. If I were to defend traditional religion's stance, I would say that a belief in human superiority (Epstein's assertion that "values and ethical behavior . . . can only be really found in human beings") does not necessarily mean exploitation of and infliction of suffering upon less able beings. The more knowledgeable, skilled, experienced, gifted people are responsible, for love's sake, to care for and to work for the betterment of less gifted people. (Jesus might add, "To whom much has been given, much will be required.") Superior beings can "lord it over" lesser beings; OR they could care for them.
Likewise if human beings are superior to other species -- because of their intellect, ability to reflect, and to plan -- then they could choose to care for rather than inflict suffering upon other species. The fact that the human race chose another path - that of exploitation - doesn't disprove that humans are in some significant way "superior" but that they have made a wrong choice. A choice that we can change.
Ralph,
ReplyDeleteOnce again, thank you for responding to my comment. (Hopefully, I won’t embarrass myself too much, this time.) First, let me remind you that the Humane Society of the United States (HSUS) recently launched a new outreach program to help churches, including the UCC, with animal welfare issues:
HSUS: Faith Outreach
http://www.humanesociety.org/faith
HSUS: United Church of Christ
http://www.humanesociety.org/about/departments/faith/facts/statements/united_church_of_christ.html
Now, as you know, I initially had a bad emotional response to the repeated use of the word ‘superior’ in your reply to my comment, because it harkened back, in my mind, to the rhetoric of racism. For that reason, that may not be the best choice of words with which to address animal welfare—on the other hand, maybe we should reclaim that word or concept in our defense of animals and force a rethink. Leading philosophers behind the animal movement, like Peter Singer, state their case in terms of the principle of equality or ‘equal consideration of interests;’ that is, the sense in which all humans are equal. Personally, I like the really forceful way that JS Mill put it, long ago, when human slavery was the debate:
"Nothing is more natural to human beings, nor, up to a certain point in cultivation, more universal, than to estimate the pleasures and pains of others as deserving of regard exactly in proportion to their likeness to ourselves. These superstitions of selfishness had the characteristics by which Dr. Whewell recognises his moral rules; and his opinion on the rights of animals shows that in this case at least he is consistent. We are perfectly willing to stake the whole question on this one issue. Granted that any practice causes more pain to animals than it gives pleasure to man; is that practice moral or immoral? And if, exactly in proportion as human beings raise their heads out of the slough of selfishness, they do not with one voice answer “immoral,” let the morality of the principle of utility be forever condemned. "
--John Stuart Mill, The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, Volume X - Essays on Ethics, Religion, and Society, ed. John M. Robson, Introduction by F.E.L. Priestley (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1985). Chapter: WHEWELL ON MORAL PHILOSOPHY 1852
Accessed from
http://oll.libertyfund.org/title/241/21497
on 2012-02-28
We all know that some people defend or defended racism in terms of the alleged ‘superiority’ of one race over another. That is certainly problematic, but many people seem to have a view of animals that is quite similar to such a racist’s view of other peoples. Nobody denies that the average human being is superior, in some senses, to all other animals on Earth, such as superior (on average) in power, general intelligence or other abilities. Is that morally relevant? If it turned out to be true that the average intelligence or IQ of one race was higher than that of another race (Germans vs Jews, Europeans vs Asians, whites vs blacks), would that justify racism? I don’t think so.
Humans certainly have a superior (and exclusive) legal status under US laws, but that is not the final word. Under US law, animals are still categorized as property, just as women and blacks once were, but the EU has created a new legal category for nonhuman animals: ‘sentient beings’. It is arguable that some nonhuman animals ought to be granted personhood status and a right to life, if they are self-conscious and have a sense of, or plans for, the future.
Do humans have an infinitely superior MORAL status, just because they are BIOLOGICALLY human, regardless of any other characteristics that an individual may or may not have, so that even the slightest human interest or pleasure (perhaps 2 cents worth) should always outweigh nonhuman agony? No, I don’t think so. Species is simply not a morally relevant characteristic, I believe, in the sense that race or sex is not morally relevant.